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Abstract
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a
network, and each agent’s utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links
in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for this problem have either focused on only
Nash welfare [8], or ignored strategic behavior [20]. We propose a nonlinear variant of the classic
trading post mechanism, and show that for almost the entire family of CES welfare functions
(which includes maxmin welfare, Nash welfare, and utilitarian welfare), every Nash equilibrium
of our mechanism is optimal. We also prove that fully strategyproof mechanisms for this problem
are impossible in general, with the exception of maxmin welfare. More broadly, our work shows
that even small modifications (such as allowing nonlinear constraints) can dramatically increase
the power of market mechanisms like trading post.
1 Introduction
Bandwidth allocation is a classic resource allocation problem where competing agents wish to
transmit data across paths in a network. Each link has a fixed capacity, and each agent’s utility is
equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path, i.e., the rate at
which she is able to transmit data. We follow the standard model of Kelly et al. [23], where there
are no monetary payments, and each agent’s path is fixed in advance.
Although one could consider a model where bandwidth allocation and routing are handled si-
multaneously (i.e., by allowing agents to choose their paths), that would be less accurate in terms of
how the internet actually works: routing (which is handled by IP) and bandwidth allocation (which
is handled by TCP) are generally separate problems1. This paper is about bandwidth allocation,
where pricing-based schemes (like trading post) naturally correspond to signaling mechanisms that
indicate which links are congested, and an end-point protocol like TCP [10] can be thought of as
agent responses. One of the foundational works in the area of bandwidth allocation is Kelly et
al. [23], whose pricing scheme results in the allocation maximizing Nash welfare (the product of
utilities).
In this paper, we take the role of a social planner, whose goal is to design a mechanism that
leads to a “desirable” outcome (for some definition of “desirable”). We study this through the
lens of implementation theory. A mechanism is said to Nash-implement a social choice rule Ψ (for
example, Ψ could denote Nash welfare maximization) if every problem instance has least one Nash
equilibrium, and every Nash equilibrium outcome is optimal with respect to Ψ. This is similar to
saying that the price of anarchy – the ratio of the optimum and the “worst” Nash equilibrium –
1See Section 1.3 for a discussion of routing games.
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of the mechanism is 1.2 In this paper, we focus on pure Nash equilibria, i.e., we do not consider
randomized strategies.
The result of Kelly et al. [23] assumes that agents are not strategic, and thus the Nash equilibria
of their mechanism may be poor. In contrast, our augmented trading post mechanism will lead to
optimal Nash equilibria, not just for Nash welfare, but for an entire family of welfare functions.
1.1 Trading post
Our main tool will be an augmented version of the trading post mechanism. In the standard trading
post mechanism, each agent i submits a bid bij ∈ R≥0 on each good j, with the constraint that∑
j bij ≤ 1 for each agent i. Let xij be the fraction of good j that agent i receives: then trading
post’s allocation rule is xij =
bij∑
k bkj
. In words, each agent receives a share of the good proportional
to her share of the aggregate bid on that good. The bids consist of “fake money”: agents have no
value for leftover money.
Trading post has the desirable property that the information requirements are quite light. Each
agent’s best response only depends on the aggregate bid of the other agents (i.e.,
∑
k 6=i bkj), not on
their individual bids. Furthermore, the allocation rule is decentralized in the sense that there is no
centralized price computation, and each link j only needs to know the bids b1j , b2j , . . . bnj.
However, the vanilla version of trading post also has limitations. First of all, it is not even
guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium for every problem instance.3 A partial solution to this was
proposed by [8]. For every ε > 0, they gave a modified version of trading post (parameterized by
ε) that always has a Nash equilibrium, and where every Nash equilibrium attains at least 1− ε of
the maximum possible Nash welfare.4 In the language of implementation theory, this mechanism
Nash-implements a 1− ε approximation of Nash welfare. In the course of our main result, we will
strengthen this to full Nash implementation. It is important to note that their mechanism still uses
the linear constraint of
∑
j bij ≤ 1; their modification has to do with a minimum allowable bid (see
Section 1.3 for additional discussion).
In this paper, we augment the trading post mechanism by allowing nonlinear bid constraints:
instead of
∑
j bij ≤ 1, we require
∑
j fj(bij) ≤ 1 for each agent i, where each fj is a nondecreasing
function chosen by us ahead of time. Importantly, all agents are still subject to the same bid
constraint, and we use the same allocation rule of xij =
bij∑
k bkj
. This novel augmentation allows us
to Nash-implement a wide range welfare functions, as opposed to just Nash welfare. Specifically,
we will Nash-implement almost the entire family of CES welfare functions (see Section 1.4 for more
details). This is our main result.
1.2 CES welfare functions
A welfare function [4, 36] assigns a real number to each possible outcome, with higher numbers (i.e,
higher welfare) indicating outcomes that are more desirable to the social planner. Different welfare
functions represent different priorities: in particular the tradeoff of overall efficiency and individual
fairness. For any constant ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1], the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare
2The price of anarchy [24] concept applies only when Ψ can be written as the maximization of some cardinal
function. This is true when Ψ denotes Nash welfare maximization, but is not true in general.
3This happens when there is a good that has large enough supply that is not the “rate limiting factor” for any
agent; see Sections 1.3 and 2.2.1 for additional discussion.
4They study Leontief utilities, which is a generalization of bandwidth allocation to the setting where agents may
desire goods in different proportions.
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function is defined by ( n∑
i=1
uρi
)1/ρ
where ui is agent i’s utility, and ρ ∈ R is the elasticity parameter. When ρ = 1, this is the
utilitarian welfare, i.e., sum of utilities. Taking limits as ρ goes to −∞ and 0 yields maxmin welfare
(the minimum utility) [34, 37, 38] and Nash welfare (the product of utilities) [22, 29], respectively.
This class of welfare functions was first proposed by Atkinson [3] (although under a different name),
and further developed by [5]. See [28] for a modern introduction to this class of welfare functions.
The closer ρ gets to −∞, the more the social planner cares about individual equality (maxmin
welfare being the extreme case of this), and the closer ρ gets to 1, the more the social planner
cares about overall societal good (utilitarian welfare being the extreme case of this). The CES
welfare function (as opposed to the CES agent utility function) has received almost no attention in
the computational economics community, despite being well-studied in the traditional economics
literature [3, 5].
These welfare functions also admit an axiomatic characterization [28]:
1. Monotonicity: if one agent’s utility increases while all others are unchanged, the welfare
function should prefer the new allocation.
2. Symmetry: the welfare function should treat all agents the same.
3. Continuity: the welfare function should be continuous.
4. Independence of common scale: scaling all agent utilities by the same factor should not affect
which allocations have better welfare than others.
5. Independence of unconcerned agents: when comparing the welfare of two allocations, the
comparison should not depend on agents who have the same utility in both allocations.
6. The Pigou-Dalton principle: all things being equal, the welfare function should prefer more
equitable allocations [12, 33].
Ignoring monotonic transformations of the welfare function (which of course do not affect which
allocations have better welfare than others), the set of welfare functions satisfying these axioms is
exactly the set of CES welfare functions with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]5, including Nash welfare [28].6
This axiomatic characterization shows that we are not just focusing on an arbitrary class of welfare
functions: CES welfare functions are arguably the most reasonable welfare functions.
Recently, [20] showed that for any CES welfare function, nonlinear pricing can be used to
obtain market equilibria with optimal CES welfare. However, their equilibrium notion – price
curve equilibrium – assumes that agents are not strategic.
1.3 Related work
Trading post and market games. The trading post mechanism – first proposed by Shapley
and Shubik [39], and sometimes called the “Shapley-Shubik game”7 – is an example of a strategic
5Without the Pigou-Dalton principle, ρ > 1 is also allowed. This can result in unnatural cases where it is optimal
to give one agent everything and the rest none, even when this does not maximize the sum of utilities.
6This actually does not include maxmin welfare, which obeys weak monotonicity but not strict monotonicity.
7A plethora of other names have been applied to this mechanism as well, including the proportional share mech-
anism [17], the Chinese auction [27], and the Tullock contest in rent seeking [9].
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market game (for an overview of strategic market games, see [19]). The study of markets has a long
history in the economics literature [2, 6, 40, 42]8, but most of this work assumes that agents are
price-taking, meaning that they treat the market prices are fixed, and do not behave strategically
to affect these prices.9 A market game, however, treats the agents as strategic players who wish to
selfishly maximize their own utility. Trading post does not have explicit prices set by a centralized
authority: instead, prices arise implicitly from agents’ strategic behavior. In particular,
∑
k bkj –
the aggregate bid on good j – functions as the implicit price of good j. Although the trading post
mechanism is well-defined for any utility functions, the Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to have
many nice properties in general, except in the limit as the number of agents goes to infinity [14]
(in this case, the trading post Nash equilibria converge to the price-taking market equilibria).
The paper most relevant to ours is [8], which analyzed the performance of trading post (with
a linear bid constraint) with respect to Nash welfare. They showed that for Leontief utilities
(which generalize bandwidth allocation), a modified trading post mechanism approximates the
Nash welfare arbitrarily well. Specifically, for any ε > 0, they gave a mechanism (parameterized by
ε) which achieves a 1− ε Nash welfare approximation: there is at least one Nash equilibrium, and
every Nash equilibrium has Nash welfare at least 1− ε times the optimal Nash welfare. Thus the
price of anarchy is at most 11−ε ; equivalently, this mechanism Nash-implements a 1−ε approximation
of Nash welfare. The reason that they were unable to perfectly implement Nash welfare is because
when there is a good with supply much larger than other goods10, vanilla trading post may not
even have a Nash equilibrium. To fix this, they added a minimum allowable bid, and showed that
for any ε > 0, there is a minimum bid that gives them a 1 − ε Nash implementation. Instead of
having a minimum allowable bid, we will add a special bid β, which will allow us to strengthen this
to full Nash implementation (see Section 2.2.1).
It is worth noting that [8] also considers a broader class of valuations than Leontief, but for this
broader class, only a 1/2 approximation is achieved. Another recent paper gave a strategyproof
mechanism achieving a 1/e ≈ .368 approximation of the optimal Nash welfare [11]. Their 1/e
approximation guarantee is weaker than the 1/2 guarantee of [8] (and the 1−ε guarantee for Leon-
tief), but strategyproofness is sometimes more desirable that Nash implementation. Unfortunately,
strategyproofness in the bandwidth allocation setting is generally impossible (Theorem 5.1).
Price-taking markets. The simplest mathematical model of a price-taking market is a Fisher
market, due to Irving Fisher [6]. In a Fisher market, there is a set of goods for sale, and each
buyer enters the market with a budget she wishes to spend. Each good has a price, and each buyer
purchases her favorite bundle among those that are affordable under her budget constraint. Prices
are linear, meaning that the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased, and buyers
are assumed to have no value for leftover money, so they will always exhaust their entire budgets. A
market equilibrium assigns a price to each good so that the demand exactly equals the supply. For
a wide class of agent utilities, including bandwidth allocation utilities, an equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist [2].11 The seminal work of Eisenberg and Gale showed that for linear prices and a large
class of agent utilities (including bandwidth allocation), the market equilibria correspond exactly
8Recently, this topic has garnered significant attention in the computer science community as well (see [41] for an
algorithmic exposition).
9There is some work treating price-taking market models as strategic games; see e.g., [1, 7, 8].
10Specifically, this occurs when a good has price zero. Having a much larger supply than other goods is sufficient
but not necessary for this.
11Specifically, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as long agent utilities are continuous, quasi-concave, and non-
satiated. The full Arrow-Debreu model also allows for agents to enter to market with goods themselves and not only
money; the necessary conditions on utilities are slightly more complex in that setting.
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to the allocations maximizing Nash welfare [15, 16].12 Furthermore, the prices are equal to the
optimal Lagrange multipliers in the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare (the Eisenberg-
Gale convex program).
Recently, [20] extended this model to allow nonlinear prices, where the cost of a good may be
any nondecreasing function of the quantity purchased. These functions are called price curves.
They showed that for bandwidth allocation, for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), there exist price curves that
make every maximum CES welfare allocation a market equilibrium. Furthermore, these prices take
a natural form: the cost of purchasing x ∈ R≥0 of good j is gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ, for some nonnegative
constants q1 . . . qm. Interestingly, for ρ = 0 – which denotes Nash welfare – this function form
reduces to a linear price qj , and we know that linear pricing maximizes Nash welfare. Furthermore,
q1 . . . qm are the optimal Lagrange multipliers in the convex program for maximizing CES welfare.
Trading post with linear bid constraints (
∑
j bij ≤ 1) can be thought of as a market game
equivalent of the Fisher market model: it implements Nash welfare ([8] proved a 1−ε approximation,
but we will strengthen this to exact implementation), and the implicit trading post prices (the
aggregate bids) are equal to the Fisher market equilibrium prices. Our augmented trading post,
with bid constraint
∑
j fj(bij) ≤ 1, can be thought of as a market game equivalent of the price
curves model. The augmented trading post mechanism we use to implement CES welfare will use
fj(b) = b
1−ρ for each good j, further strengthening this analogy.
Bandwidth allocation. Bandwidth allocation has been studied both with and without monetary
payments; we focus on the later setting, following the model of Kelly et al. [23]. Although it has
been known that different marking schemes (such as RED and CHOKe [18, 32]) and versions of
TCP lead to different objective functions (eg. [31]), a market-based understanding was developed
only for Nash Welfare, starting with the pioneering work of Kelly et al. [23]. Furthermore, the
market scheme of Kelly et al. is in the price-taking setting; the only strategic market analysis of
bandwidth allocation that we are aware of is the 1− ε approximation of Nash welfare due to [8].
Routing games. A related topic is that of routing games. In a routing game, each agent has
a fixed source and destination in the network, but chooses which path she uses to get there.
Each agent incurs a cost for each link she travels over, and the cost each agent pays is typically
nondecreasing function of the total traffic over that link. Each agent wishes to minimize the total
cost she incurs by strategically choosing which path to follow. In the standard bandwidth allocation
model, each agent has a fixed path, and her goal is to maximize the total amount of flow she is able
to send from her source to her destination (which is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives
among links in her path). Instead of choosing which path to follow, each agent’s strategy is how
she bids (or more generally, how she interacts with the allocation mechanism). For an overview of
routing games, see [35].
Implementation theory. Implementation theory is the study of designing mechanisms whose
outcomes coincide with some desirable social choice rule. A social choice rule could be the max-
imization of a cardinal function, such as a CES welfare function, or something else, such as the
set of Pareto optimal allocations. A full survey is outside the scope of this paper; we direct the
interested reader to [26].
12The conditions for the correspondence between Fisher market equilibria and Nash welfare are slightly stricter
than those for market equilibrium existence, but are still quite general. Sufficient criteria were given in [15] and
generalized slightly by [21].
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ρ = −∞ ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), ρ = 1
Nash-implementable? ✓ (Thm. 5.3) ✓ (Thm. 4.1) ?
DSE-implementable? ✓ (Thm. 5.2) ✗ (Thm. 5.1) ✗ (Thm. 5.1)
Table 1: A summary of our main implementation results. Here ρ = −∞ denotes maxmin welfare,
ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) includes Nash welfare as ρ = 0, and ρ = 1 denotes utilitarian welfare. DSE stands for
“dominant strategy equilibrium”. “✓” indicates that the type of implementation specified by the
row is possible for the social choice rule specified by the column, while “✗” indicates that we give
a counterexample, and “?” indicates an open question.
The “outcome” of a mechanism is not really well-defined; we need to specify a solution concept.
The solution concept that we focus on for most of this paper is Nash equilibrium. Possibly the
most crucial result regarding implementation in Nash equilibrium (Nash implementation, for short)
is due to Maskin [25], who identified a necessary condition for Nash implementation, and a partial
converse. He showed that in a very general environment (much broader than bandwidth allocation),
any Nash-implementable social choice rule must satisfy what he calls monotonicity. Monotonicity,
in combination with a property called no veto power, is sufficient for Nash implementation. In
Section 4.2.1, we show that CES welfare functions do not satisfy no veto power, and so cannot be
Nash-implemented by Maskin’s approach.
1.4 Our results
Our results fall into two categories, both summarized by Table 1.
Nash-implementing CES welfare functions. We view the Nash implementation of CES wel-
fare functions by trading post as our main result (Theorem 4.1). For each ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), we define
an augmented trading post mechanism with a nonlinear bid constraint of
∑
j b
1−ρ
ij ≤ 1 for each
agent i.13 We denote this mechanism by AT P(ρ). We show that AT P(ρ) has at least one Nash
equilibrium, and that all of its Nash equilibria maximize CES welfare.
Our result improves that of [20] by strengthening their price curve equilibrium (which assumes
agents are not strategic) to a strategic equilibrium, and improves that of [8] by generalizing from just
Nash welfare to all CES welfare functions (except ρ = 1) and strengthening their 1−ε approximation
to exact implementation.14 Furthermore, because the price curve equilibria can be computed in
polynomial time [20], our Nash equilibria can also be computed in polynomial time.
Our proof makes use of the following results (stated informally):
1. Theorem 3.1: Any Nash equilibrium of AT P can be converted into an “equivalent” price
curve equilibrium.
2. Theorem 3.2: Any price curve equilibrium can be converted into an “equivalent” Nash equi-
librium of AT P .
13The reader may notice that for ρ = 0 – which corresponds to Nash welfare – this constraint reduces to the
standard linear constraint of
∑
j bij ≤ 1, which is what we should expect: we know from [8] that trading post with
the linear constraint leads to good Nash welfare.
14It is worth noting that the result of [8] holds for Leontief utilities, a generalization of bandwidth allocation
utilities.
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3. Lemma 4.3 [20]: If x is a maximum CES welfare allocation, then there exist price curves g
of the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ such that (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium.
4. Lemma 4.4 [20]: If (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium and each gj has the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ,
then x is a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 together imply that x is a maximum CES welfare allocation if and only if it
is a price curve equilibrium with respect to some price curves g of the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ (where
q1 . . . qm are nonnegative constants). Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 allow us to convert between price curve
equilibria and Nash equilibria of AT P , and thus enable us to apply Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 to the
Nash equilibria of AT P(ρ). Specifically, Theorem 3.1 in combination with Lemma 4.4 will show
that any Nash equilibrium of AT P(ρ) maximizes CES welfare, and Theorem 3.2 in combination
with Lemma 4.3 will show that AT P(ρ) has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Section 3 is devoted to proving our reduction between price curve equilibrium and Nash equilib-
ria of trading post: Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. This reduction is the main tool we use to Nash-implement
CES welfare maximization. Section 4 then uses this reduction, in combination with Lemmas 4.3
and 4.4, to prove our main theorem: Theorem 4.1.
Our trading post approach breaks down for ρ = −∞ and ρ = 1. We are able to Nash-implement
ρ = −∞ by a different mechanism (see below), but we were not able to resolve whether ρ = 1 is
Nash-implementable. We leave this as an open question.
Results for dominant strategy implementation and maxmin welfare. A natural question
is whether these results can be improved from Nash implementation to implementation in dominant
strategy equilibrium (DSE). Section 5 shows that the answer is mostly no: for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1],
there is no mechanism which DSE-implements CES welfare maximization (Theorem 5.1). We do
this by showing that there is no strategyproof mechanism for this problem: the revelation principle
tells us that DSE-implementability implies strategyproofness, so impossibility of strategyproofness
implies impossibility of DSE implementation.
On the positive side, we show that maxmin welfare (ρ = −∞) can in fact be DSE-implemented
by a simple revelation mechanism (Theorem 5.2). This is actually stronger than strategyproofness:
strategyproofness requires truth-telling to be a DSE, but does not rule out the possibility of addi-
tional dominant strategy equilibria that are not optimal. In contrast, DSE implementation requires
every DSE to be optimal.
Although every DSE is also a Nash equilibrium, DSE-implementability does not imply Nash-
implementability [13]. A DSE implementation requires every DSE to be optimal, but there could
be Nash equilibria (which are not dominant strategy equilibria) that are not optimal. This means
that Theorem 5.2 does not imply Nash-implementability of maxmin welfare. In fact, our revelation
mechanism which DSE-implements maxmin welfare is not a Nash implementation: there exist Nash
equilibria which are not optimal (see Section 5.2.1 for an example). Our last result of Section 5 is
that there is a different mechanism which does Nash-implement maxmin welfare (Theorem 5.3).15
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formally defines the models of band-
width allocation, price curves, trading post, and implementation theory. Section 3 presents our
reduction between price curves and our augmented trading post mechanism. In Section 4, we use
this reduction to Nash-implement CES welfare maximization for ρ ∈ (−∞, 1). Finally, Section 5
handles DSE-implementation and maxmin welfare.
15The mechanism for Theorem 5.3 is unrelated to trading post: our trading post approach breaks down for both
maxmin welfare and utilitarian welfare. This is because gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ is not a valid price curve when ρ → −∞ or
when ρ = 1.
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2 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be a set of agents, and let M = {1, 2, . . . m} be a set of divisible goods, each
representing a link in a network. Throughout the paper, we use i and k to refer to agents and j
and ℓ to refer to goods. Let sj denote the available supply of good sj . The social planner needs
to determine an allocation x ∈ Rn×m≥0 , where xi ∈ R
m
≥0 is the bundle of agent i, and xij ∈ [0, sj ] is
the quantity of good j allocated to agent i. An allocation cannot allocate more than the available
supply: x is a valid allocation if and only if
∑
i xij ≤ sj for all j.
Agent i’s utility for a bundle xi is denoted by ui(xi) ∈ R≥0. We assume agents have bandwidth
allocation utilities, which take the form:
ui(xi) = min
j∈Ri
xij
where Ri is the set of links that agent i requires. We assume that Ri 6= ∅ for all i, i.e., each agent
desires at least one good. It will sometimes be useful to define weights wij where wij = 1 if j ∈ Ri,
and 0 otherwise.
Just as agents have utilities over the bundles they receive, we can imagine a social planner who
wishes to design a mechanism to maximize some societal welfare function Φ(x). One can think of Φ
as the social planner’s utility function, which takes as input the agent utilities, instead of a bundle of
goods. The most well-studied welfare functions are the maxmin welfare Φ(x) = mini∈N ui(xi), the
Nash welfare Φ(x) =
(∏
i∈N ui
)1/n
, and the utilitarian welfare Φ(x) =
∑
i∈N ui(xi). As discussed
in Section 1, these three welfare functions can be generalized by a CES welfare function:
Φρ(x) =
(∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
where ρ is a constant in (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]. The limits as ρ→ −∞ and ρ→ 0 yield maxmin welfare
and Nash welfare, respectively. Throughout the paper, we will use ρ = −∞ and ρ = 0 to denote
maxmin welfare and Nash welfare (e.g., “ This theorem holds for ρ ∈ (∞, 1)” would include Nash
welfare but not maxmin welfare).
For ρ 6= 1, this function is strictly concave in u1(x1) . . . un(xn), so every optimal allocation x
has the same utility vector.16
2.1 Price curves
Price curves, introduced by [20], generalize the well-studied Fisher market model. In a Fisher
market [6], each good is available for sale and each agent enters the market with a fixed budget she
wishes to spend. Each good j has a price pj , and the cost of purchasing x ∈ R≥0 of good j is pj ·x.
Price curves allow the cost of a good to be any nondecreasing function of the quantity purchased.
When each price curve gj is defined by gj(x) = pj · x, this reduces to the Fisher market model. We
do not consider strategic behavior in the price curves model; instead, we use this model as a tool
for analyzing the Nash equilibria of our augmented trading post.
Like the Fisher market model, the price curves model assumes that agents have no value for
leftover money; this will imply that each agent always spends her entire budget. Throughout the
paper, we will assume that all agents have the same budget, and normalize all budgets to 1 without
16There could be multiple optimal allocations, however. For example, consider one agent who desires two goods
with supply s1 and s2 > s1. The agent’s optimal utility will be s1, but we can either allocate the rest of the second
good anyway, or leave some unallocated; the utility is unaffected.
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loss of generality. In this paper, we will assume that price curves are either strictly increasing, or
identically zero (denoted gj ≡ 0)
17. We also assume that price curves are normalized (gj(0) = 0)
and continuous.
Informally, a price curve equilibrium assigns a price curve gj : R≥0 → R≥0 to each good j so
that the agents’ demand equals supply. Formally, for price curves g = (g1 . . . gm), the cost of a
bundle xi is
Cg(xi) =
∑
j∈M
gj(xij)
and the demand set Di(g) is the set of agent i’s favorite affordable bundles:
Di(g) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: Cg(xi)≤1
ui(xi)
If gj is strictly increasing for all j ∈ M , an agent with bandwidth allocation utility will only
purchase goods in her set Ri, and will purchase the exact same quantity of each. When gj ≡ 0,
any agent can add more of that good at no additional cost: this cannot improve her utility, but it
also cannot hurt it. This complication with zero-price goods is discussed more in Section 2.2.1.
A price curve equilibrium (PCE) (x,g) is an allocation x and price curves g such that
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(g).
2. The market clears: for all j ∈M ,
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj, and
∑
i∈N xij = sj whenever gj 6≡ 0.
18
The second condition states that the demand never exceeds the supply, and that any good whose
supply is not completely exhausted must have a price of zero. This implies that no agent has utility
for the leftover goods: otherwise she would simply buy more at no additional cost.
2.2 The trading post mechanism
In the standard trading post mechanism, each agent i places a bid bi ∈ R
m
≥0, where bij ∈ R≥0 is the
amount i bids on good j. Each agent i must obey the constraint
∑
j∈M bij ≤ 1. We use b ∈ R
m×n
≥0
to represent the matrix of all bids.
Each agent receives a fraction of the good in proportion to the fraction of the total bid on that
good. Formally,
xij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
· sj
As in the Fisher market model, we assume that agents have no value for leftover money. The
aggregate bid on good j is
∑
k∈N bij, and can be thought of as the “price” of good j: in fact, this
analogy will be crucial in our proofs.
We augment the standard trading post mechanism in two ways. The first is necessary in order
to ensure the existence of equilibrium when goods have price zero, and the second is to extend this
mechanism to implement CES welfare functions beyond Nash welfare.
17This assumption is not made in [20], but is helpful for our purposes.
18The definition given in [20] omits this condition, because that paper is also interested in equilibria where the
supply is not exhausted. Such equilibria cannot be optimal for our purposes, so we disallow them in our definition.
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2.2.1 Handling goods with price zero
In Fisher markets, it is possible for some goods to have price zero. This occurs when that good
is not the “rate-limiting factor”, i.e., there is enough of that good for everyone and the supply
constraint is not tight. This is a problem for standard trading post: in order to receive any amount
of good j, agent i must bid bij > 0. But if the supply constraint is not tight in the Fisher market
setting, there will be at least one agent receiving more of the good than they need. Such an agent
will decrease their bid so that she is only receiving what she needs. However, this process will
continue infinitely, with agents repeatedly decreasing their bids on this good, but never reaching
bid 0.
To handle this, we present the following modified allocation rule. We allow an additional special
bid of β so that bij ∈ R≥0 ∪ {β}. Conceptually, a bid of 0 indicates that the agent actually does
not want the good; bidding β indicates that the agent desires the good, but is hoping to get it for
free, so to speak. We treat β as zero in arithmetic, for example, in the constraint
∑
j∈M bij ≤ 1.
Similarly, we interpret bij > 0 to mean bij 6∈ {0, β}.
Our modified allocation rule follows this series of steps:
1. If at least one agent bids a positive (i.e., neither 0 nor β) amount on good j, we follow the
standard trading post rule: xij =
bij∑
k∈N bij
sj.
2. However, if all agents bid 0 either or β on good j, then we allow each agent to have as much
good j as they want. Specifically, for any agent i with bij = β, let ℓi be an arbitrary good
with biℓi > 0. Then we allocate xij = xiℓi . For completeness, if there is no good ℓ with biℓ > 0
(although this will never happen at equilibrium), we set xij = 0. For agents i bidding 0 on
good j, we set xij = 0.
3. After following the above steps, for any good ℓ where
∑
i∈N xiℓ > sℓ (violating the supply
constraint), for all i ∈ N bidding β on good ℓ, we set xij = 0 for all j ∈ M as a penalty. In
words, if so many agents try to get good j for free that the supply constraint is violated, they
are all penalized by receiving nothing. Not to worry: this will never happen at equilibrium.
This modification will allow us to simulate a good having price zero.
It is important that we allow separate bids of 0 and β. Consider a good j where bkj ∈ {0, β}
for all k ∈ N . Suppose some agent i does not need good j, and bidding β would cause the supply
constraint to be violated and the Step 3 penalty to be invoked. Such an agent can bid 0 on good
j, which allows her to still spend no money on this good, without the possibility of invoking the
Step 3 penalty.
2.2.2 Allowing nonlinear constraints
It will turn out that trading post with the standard constraint of
∑
j∈M bij ≤ 1 implements Nash
welfare. To implement other CES welfare functions, let f = (f1 . . . fm) be nondecreasing functions
from R≥0 to R≥0. We call f the constraint curves. Like price curves, we assume that each fj is
continuous and normalized. Unlike price curves, we require each fj to be strictly increasing: fj ≡ 0
is not allowed. Throughout the paper, we will use f , f ′ to denote constraint curves and g,g′ to
denote price curves.
We define the mechanism AT P(f) as follows. Given bids b = (b1 . . . bn) ∈ R
n×m
≥0 , AT P(f)
allocates each good j according to the three-step allocation rule described in the previous section.
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However, each agent’s bid constraint is now∑
j∈M
fj(bij) ≤ 1
We can define Cf (bi) like we defined Cg(xi) for price curves g and a bundle xi. Specifically,
Cf (bi) =
∑
j∈M fj(bij). Thus each agent’s constraint is Cg(xi) ≤ 1 in the price curves model, and
is Cf (bi) ≤ 1 in the trading post model.
The most natural case will be when f1 . . . fm are all the same function. In particular, letAT P(ρ)
be the mechanism where fj(b) = b
1−ρ for all j ∈ M . In general, we will use AT P(f ,b) to denote
the allocation x produced by the mechanism AT P(f) when agents bid b ∈ Rn×m≥0 .
2.3 Implementation theory
This section covers only the basic concepts of implementation theory; we direct the reader to [26]
for a broad overview of this area.
A social choice rule Ψ takes as input a utility profile u = u1 . . . un and returns a set of “optimal”
outcomes. In our case, Ψ will represent maximizing a CES welfare function. Define Ψρ(u) by
Ψρ(u) = argmax
x∈Rn×m
≥0
(∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
In general, a social choice rule need not express the maximization of any cardinal function.
Let C be a solution concept (e.g., Nash equilibrium), H be a mechanism (sometimes called a
“game form”), and H(u) be the induced game for utility profile u.19 Let C(H(u)) be the set of
strategy profiles20 satisfying C for that game. For example, if C denotes Nash equilibrium, then
C(H(u)) would be the set of Nash equilibria of the game H(u). To distinguish between equilibrium
strategies (e.g., what agents bid) and equilibrium outcomes (e.g., the resulting allocation), we use
CX(H(u)) to denote the set of outcomes resulting from strategy profiles satisfying C.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism H implements a social choice rule Ψ if for any utility profile u,
∅ 6= CX(H(u)) ⊆ Ψ(u)
Using the running example of Nash equilibrium, H Nash-implements Ψ if for any utility profile
u, there is at least one Nash equilibrium, and every Nash equilibrium of H(u) results in an outcome
that is optimal under Ψ. We denote the set of Nash equilibria of H(u) by NE(H(u)), and the
set of outcomes resulting from some Nash equilibrium by NEX(H(u)). When only a single utility
profile u is under consideration, we will frequently leave u implicit and write NE(H).
It is worth noting that some of the literature refers to Definition 2.1 as weak implementation,
where full implementation requires that CX(H(u)) = Ψ(u), i.e., every outcome that is optimal
under Ψ should be a Nash equilibrium outcome of H(u). We feel that this distinction is not
important in our case, since the utility vector in Ψρ(u) is unique (with the exception of ρ = 1,
which we do not Nash implement anyway): thus allocations x ∈ Ψρ(u) differ only in what they
do with leftover supply, i.e., supply that will not affect anyone’s utility. If one truly cared about
this distinction, our augmented trading post mechanism could be further augmented by allowing
19In general, the difference between a game and a mechanism is that the game definition includes the agent utilities,
whereas a mechanism does not.
20A strategy profile is a list of strategies S1 . . . Sn, where Si is the strategy played by agent i. For trading post, a
strategy is bi ∈ R
m
≥0, and a strategy profile is b ∈ R
m×n
≥0 .
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each agent another special bid that indicated how much of the leftover supply they wanted. Since
these special bids would not affect the utilities, the Nash equilibrium utilities would not be affected,
and there would be a combination of leftover supply bids that achieves any maximum CES welfare
allocation.21
We remind the reader of the following standard definitions:
1. Nash equilibrium: a strategy profile where no agent can strictly improve her utility by uni-
laterally changing her strategy. We consider only pure Nash equilibria, i.e., we do not allow
randomized strategies.
2. Dominant strategy: a strategy that is optimal regardless of what other agents do.
3. Dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE): a strategy profile where each agent plays a dominant
strategy.
4. Strategyproofness: A revelation mechanism (i.e., a mechanism that asks each agent to report
her utility function) is strategyproof if telling the truth is a dominant strategy for every agent.
DSE-implementability implies strategyproofness via the revelation principle22, but it is not
generally true that any strategyproof social choice rule is DSE-implementable. Strategyproofness
ensures that truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium, but there could also be bad equilibria
that are not consistent with Ψ.
By definition, every DSE is also a Nash equilibrium. However, it is not generally true that
DSE-implementability implies Nash-implementability [13]. DSE-implementability requires that ev-
ery DSE of the mechanism be optimal under Ψ, but the mechanism might have additional Nash
equilibria (that are not dominant strategy equilibria) that are not consistent with Ψ. We will need
to take both this and the previous paragraph into account when studying DSE implementation.
We now move on to our results, beginning with our reduction between price curves and AT P .
This reduction will be the main tool we use to show that AT P Nash-implement CES welfare
maximization.
3 Reduction between price curves and augmented trading post
In this section, we show that any equilibrium of our augmented trading post mechanism can be
transformed into a price curve equilibrium, and vice versa. Section 4 will use this result (along
with the existence of price curve equilibria maximizing CES welfare, due to [20]) to prove that the
AT P(ρ) mechanism Nash-implements CES welfare maximization.
Section 3.1 describes the intuition behind the reduction. Section 3.2 presents some useful nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for price curve equilibrium and trading post Nash equilibrium.
Section 3.3 shows that any trading post Nash equilibrium can be transformed into a price curve
equilibrium (Theorem 3.1), and Section 3.4 shows that any price curve equilibrium can be trans-
formed into a trading post Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3.2).
3.1 Intuition behind the reduction
First, notice that augmented trading post and price curves have similar-looking constraints:
∑
j∈M fj(bij) ≤
1 and
∑
j∈M gj(xij) ≤ 1. If f = g, these constraints become identical, so bi is a feasible bid if and
21We would also need to include another penalty step if the leftover supply bids lead to a supply constraint being
violated.
22See Chapter 9 of [30] for an introduction to the revelation principle.
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only if xi is a feasible purchase subject to price curves g. Suppose that (x,g) is a price curve
equilibrium. For now, assume each gj is strictly increasing (the formal proof will also handle the
possibility of gj ≡ 0). Let x
′ be the outcome of AT P(f) when agents bid b (i.e., x′ = AT P(f ,b)),
and suppose that bij = xij for all i, j: then
x′ij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
sj =
xij∑
k∈N xij
sj = xij
where the last equality uses the fact that
∑
k∈N xij = sj when (x,g) is a PCE and gj 6≡ 0.
Thus the allocation resulting from AT P(f) under bids b is in fact x. Furthermore, since (x,g)
is a price curve equilibrium, each agent exhausts her price curve constraint: Cg(xi) = 1. Since
f = g and b = x, this implies that Cf (bi) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, in any price curve
equilibrium with all nonzero prices, each agent should be spending exclusively on goods in her set
Ri, and purchasing them in equal amounts. Thus in the trading post outcome x
′, each agent i also
also spending exclusively on j ∈ Ri and acquiring them in equal amounts.
We claim that b is a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f). Suppose the opposite: then there must exist
an agent i and an alternate bid b′i such that bidding b
′
i instead of bi increases her utility. Thus
under b′i, she receives strictly more of all goods in Ri. But this means that she must be bidding
strictly more on each of these goods, which would violate her bid constraint, since Cf (bi) = 1 is
already tight. Therefore b must be a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f).
The above is an informal proof of one direction of the reduction: transforming price curve
equilibria into trading post equilibria. Similarly, if we are given a Nash equilibrium b of AT P(f),
we can let g = f (actually, g will be a scaled version of f) and x = AT P(f ,b), and use the same
intuition to show that (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium.
There are several additional complications. The largest of these is dealing with goods that
have price zero in g; indeed, this is the issue that prevents vanilla trading post from implementing
Nash welfare maximization [8]. Another difficulty is that in trading post, what you bid depends
on others’ bids (whereas for price curves, it only depends on g). However, due to the nature of
bandwidth allocation utilities, agents will always purchase in proportion to their weights wij , and
the outcomes at equilibrium will correspond. We will end up with the following two theorems:
Theorem 3.1. Let f be constraint curves where each fj is homogenous of degree αj for some αj >
0. For bids b ∈ NE(AT P(f)), define nonnegative constants a1 . . . am by aj = (
∑
k∈N bkj/sj)
αj .
Define price curves g by
gj(x) =
{
0 if bij ∈ {0, β} ∀i ∈ N
ajfj(x) otherwise
Let x = AT P(f ,b). Then (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. Let h be any constraint curve. Let (x,g) be a price curve equilibrium, and define
f and b by
fj(b) =
{
h(b) if gj ≡ 0
gj(b) otherwise
bij =


β if gj ≡ 0 and j ∈ Ri
0 if gj ≡ 0 and j 6∈ Ri
xij otherwise
Then b is a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f).
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3.2 Equilibrium conditions for price curves and trading post
Recall that wij = 1 if j ∈ Ri, and 0 otherwise. The following lemma for trading post states a useful
necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibria of AT P(f).
Lemma 3.1. Let x = AT P(f ,b). Then b ∈ NE(AT P(f)) if and only if all of the following hold:
1. For all i ∈ N , xij = wijui(xi) for all j ∈M where there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0.
2. For all i ∈ N , Cf (bi) = 1.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Assume that the two conditions of the lemma are true. First, we claim that bij ∈
{0, β} for all j 6∈ Ri: agent i only spends money on goods in Ri. This is because wijui(xi) = 0
for j 6∈ Ri, but bij > 0 ensures that xij > 0, so xij = wijui(xi) would be impossible. Therefore
Cf (bi) =
∑
j∈M fj(bij) =
∑
j∈Ri
fj(bij) = 1.
Now suppose that b is not a Nash equilibrium: then there exists an agent i and bid b′i such that
ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi), where x
′ is the resulting allocation when agent i bids b′i and every agent k 6= i still
bids bk. Condition 1 implies that xij = ui(xi) for all j ∈ Ri with bij > 0 (since wij = 1 for j ∈ Ri).
Since bij > 0 only when j ∈ Ri, we have xij = ui(xi) whenever bij > 0. Thus ui(x
′
i) > xij when
bij > 0. Since x
′
ij ≥ ui(x
′
i) for all j ∈ Ri, we have x
′
ij > xij when bij > 0.
We next claim that b′ij > bij whenever bij > 0. If there exists k 6= i with bkj > 0, then b
′
ij > bij
is necessary to ensure that x′ij > xij. The only other possibility is that bij > 0, but b
′
ij = β, and
bkj ∈ {0, β} for all k 6= i. But in this case, following Step 1 of AT P ’s allocation rule, xij = sj.
Then ui(xi) = sj . This is the highest utility agent i could ever have, since ui(xi) ≤ sj for all j ∈ Ri.
This contradicts ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi). We conclude that b
′
ij > bij whenever bij > 0.
Therefore, since each fj is strictly increasing,∑
j∈M
fj(bij) =
∑
j:bij>0
fj(bij) <
∑
j:bij>0
fj(b
′
ij) ≤
∑
j∈M
fj(b
′
ij)
Since Cf (bi) =
∑
j∈M fj(bij) = 1 by assumption, we have
∑
j∈M fj(b
′
ij) > 1. This means that b
′
i
violates the bid constraint, and so is not a valid bid. Therefore b is a Nash equilibrium.
( ⇐= ) Suppose that b is a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f). If Cf (bi) > 1, bi violates the supply
constraint, so b cannot be a Nash equilibrium. If Cf (bi) < 1, agent i can improve her utility
by bidding slightly more on every good (and thus receiving slightly more of every good). Thus
Cf (bi) = 1 must hold.
Suppose xiℓ 6= wiℓui(xi) for some ℓ ∈ M where there exists k ∈ N with bkℓ > 0. By definition
of ui, ui(xi)wiℓ > xiℓ is impossible, so we must have xiℓ > wiℓui(xi). Consider a new bid b
′
i where
b′ij = bij for all j 6= ℓ, but b
′
ij is such that xℓ = wiℓui(xi) (where x
′ is the resulting allocation when
i bids b′i and each k 6= i bids bk). Thus b
′
iℓ < biℓ.
By definition of ui, we have ui(x
′
i) = ui(xi), but Cf (b
′
i) < Cf (bi) = 1, since fj(b
′
ij) ≤ fj(bij) for
all j ∈ M , and fℓ(b
′
iℓ) < fℓ(biℓ). Thus there must exist a bundle b
′′
i with b
′′
ij > b
′
ij for all j, but
Cf (b
′′
i ) ≤ 1, i.e., b
′′
i obeys the bid constraint. Furthermore, let x
′′ be the resulting allocation when
i bids b′′i and each k 6= i bids bk: then x
′′
ij > x
′
ij for all j ∈ M . Therefore ui(x
′′
i ) > ui(x
′
i) = ui(xi).
But this means b cannot be a Nash equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
Next, we give an analogous lemma for price curve equilibrium. Note that the last condition in
Lemma 3.2 is simply one of the conditions in the definition of PCE.
Lemma 3.2. An allocation x and price curves g are a PCE if and only if all of the following hold:
1. For all i ∈ N , xij = wijui(xi) whenever gj 6≡ 0.
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2. For all i ∈ N , Cg(xi) = 1.
3. For all j ∈M ,
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj , and
∑
i∈N xij = sj whenever gj 6≡ 0.
Proof. The third condition is simply one of the two conditions in the definition of PCE. The other
requirement for PCE is that xi ∈ Di(g) for all i ∈ N , so it suffices to show that xi ∈ Di(g) if and
only if Cg(xi) = 1 and xij = wijui(xi) whenever gj 6≡ 0.
( =⇒ ) Suppose that Cg(xi) = 1, and xij = wijui(xi) whenever gj 6≡ 0. We first claim that agent
i only spends money on goods in Ri. This is because wijui(xi) = 0 for j 6∈ Ri (because wij = 0
for j 6∈ Ri), and spending money implies that gj 6≡ 0 and xij > 0, which makes xij = wijui(xi)
impossible. Thus Cg(xi) =
∑
j∈Ri
gj(xij) =
∑
j∈Ri:gj 6≡0
gj(xij).
Now suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists another bundle x′i that is also affordable,
and ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi). For all j ∈ Ri with gj 6≡ 0, we have xij = wijui(xi) = ui(xi) (because wij = 1
for j ∈ Ri), so ui(x
′
i) > xij for j ∈ Ri, gj 6≡ 0. Therefore
Cg(xi) =
∑
j∈Ri:gj 6≡0
gj(xij) <
∑
j∈Ri:gj 6≡0
gj(x
′
ij) ≤
∑
j∈M
gj(x
′
ij) = Cg(x
′
i)
Since, Cg(xi) = 1, we have Cg(x
′
i) > 1. But this implies that x
′
i is not affordable, which is a
contradiction. Therefore xi ∈ Di(g).
( ⇐= ) Suppose xi ∈ Di(g). If Cg(xi) > 1, xi is not affordable, which is impossible. If
Cg(xi) < 1, agent i can improve her utility by purchasing slightly more of every good. Thus∑
j∈M gj(xij) = 1 must hold.
Suppose xiℓ 6= wiℓui(xi) for some ℓ ∈ M where gj 6≡ 0. By definition, ui(xi)wiℓ > xiℓ is
impossible, so we must have xiℓ > wiℓui(xi). Consider a bundle x
′
i where x
′
ij = xij for all j 6= ℓ,
but x′iℓ = wiℓui(xi). Then ui(x
′
i) = ui(xi). Furthermore, gℓ(x
′
iℓ) < gℓ(xiℓ), so Cg(x
′
i) < Cg(xi) ≤ 1.
Consider another bundle x′′i where x
′′
ij > x
′
ij for all j ∈M , but Cg(x
′′
i ) ≤ 1: this is always possible
because each gj is continuous, and Cg(x
′
i) < 1. Then x
′′
i is affordable, but ui(x
′′
i ) > ui(x
′
i) = ui(xi).
This contradicts xi ∈ Di(g).
We are now ready to move on to the reduction itself.
3.3 Transforming trading post equilibria into price curve equilibria
This direction of the reduction will require an additional mild condition, involving the following
definition.
Definition 3.1. We say that a function f : R≥0 → R≥0 is homogenous of degree α > 0 if for any
b, c ∈ R≥0, f(c · b) = c
αf(b).
Our main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Let f be constraint curves where each fj is homogenous of degree αj for some αj >
0. For bids b ∈ NE(AT P(f)), define nonnegative constants a1 . . . am by aj = (
∑
k∈N bkj/sj)
αj .
Define price curves g by
gj(x) =
{
0 if bij ∈ {0, β} ∀i ∈ N
ajfj(x) otherwise
Let x = AT P(f ,b). Then (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium.
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Before proving Theorem 3.1, we prove several helpful lemmas (Lemmas 3.3 – 3.5). Throughout
Lemmas 3.3 – 3.5, we assume x,g, and a1 . . . am are defined as in Theorem 3.1. We also assume
that b ∈ NE(AT P(f)). Let x′ be the intermediate allocation after Step 2 of AT P ’s allocation
rule.
Our first lemma simply states that all agents end up with positive utility.
Lemma 3.3. For all i ∈ N , ui(xi) > 0.
Proof. It is always possible for each agent to bid a nonzero amount on each good and obtain nonzero
utility. Thus any Nash equilibrium must give each agent nonzero utility.
The following lemma states that the intermediate allocation after Step 2 is in fact the final
allocation.
Lemma 3.4. We have x = x′.
Proof. We need to show that Step 3 of AT P ’s allocation rule is not invoked. Suppose it were
invoked: then there is an agent i who ends up with xij = 0 for all j, and thus ui(xi) = 0. But this
contradicts Lemma 3.3. We conclude that x = x′.
Lemma 3.5 states that under these constraint curves and bids, the bid constraint is equivalent
to the price curves constraint.
Lemma 3.5. For all i ∈ N , Cg(xi) = Cf (bi).
Proof. By the allocation rule of AT P , for all j ∈M where there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0, for all
i ∈ N , we have
x′ij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
sj
Lemma 3.4 implies that x = x′. Also, since aj = (
∑
k∈N bkj/sj)
αj we have sj/
∑
k∈N bkj = a
−1/αj
j ,
so
xij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
sj = bija
−1/αj
j
whenever there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0. By the definition of g, gj 6≡ 0 if and only if there exists
k ∈ N with bkj > 0 (since constraint curves are assumed to be strictly increasing). Therefore
Cg(xi) =
∑
j∈M
gj(xij)
=
∑
j:gj≡0
gj(xij) +
∑
j:gj 6≡0
gj(xij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
ajfj(xij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
ajfj(bija
−1/αj
j )
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
aj
aj
fj(bij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
fj(bij)
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By the definition of g, gj ≡ 0 is equivalent to bkj ∈ {0, β} for all k ∈ N . Thus
∑
j:gj≡0
fj(bij) = 0,
so ∑
j:gj 6≡0
fj(bij) =
∑
j∈M
fj(bij)
= Cf (bi)
as required.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1. Let f be constraint curves where each fj is homogenous of degree αj for some αj >
0. For bids b ∈ NE(AT P(f)), define nonnegative constants a1 . . . am by aj = (
∑
k∈N bkj/sj)
αj .
Define price curves g by
gj(x) =
{
0 if bij ∈ {0, β} ∀i ∈ N
ajfj(x) otherwise
Let x = AT P(f ,b). Then (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium.
Proof. Since b ∈ NE(AT P(f)), we have Cf (bi) = 1 for all i ∈ N by Lemma 3.1. This implies
Cg(xi) = 1 by Lemma 3.5. Lemma 3.1 also gives us xij = wijui(xi) whenever there exists k ∈ N
with bkj > 0. As before, gj 6≡ 0 if and only if there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0. Therefore
xij = wijui(xi) whenever gj 6≡ 0.
Thus in order to apply Lemma 3.2, we just need to show that
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj for all j ∈ M ,
and that
∑
i∈N xij = sj whenever gj 6≡ 0. Since x is a valid allocation, we immediately have∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj for all j ∈ M . Consider an arbitrary good j with gj 6≡ 0: then by the definition
of gj , there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0. Thus good j is allocated according to Step 1 of AT P ’s
allocation rule, and we get
x′ij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
· sj
Summing this across agents gives us
∑
i∈N
x′ij =
∑
i∈N
bij∑
k∈N bkj
· sj = sj
Thus by Lemma 3.4,
∑
i∈N xij = sj, as required. Therefore we can apply Lemma 3.2 and conclude
that (x,g) is a PCE.
3.4 Transforming price curve equilibria into trading post equilibria
Our main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2. Let h be any constraint curve. Let (x,g) be a price curve equilibrium, and define
f and b by
fj(b) =
{
h(b) if gj ≡ 0
gj(b) otherwise
bij =


β if gj ≡ 0 and j ∈ Ri
0 if gj ≡ 0 and j 6∈ Ri
xij otherwise
Then b is a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f).
17
The proof of this theorem is slightly more involved that the proof of Theorem 3.1, but the
intuition is the same. As before, we prove this theorem via a series of lemmas (Lemmas 3.6 – 3.11).
Let x′ = AT P(f ,b) be the final allocation resulting from bids b, and let x′′ be the allocation
resulting from bids b after Step 2 of AT P’s allocation rule. We use these definitions and assume
that (x,g) is a PCE for the remainder of Section 3.4.
As in the other direction of the reduction, our first lemma states that all agents end up with
positive utility.
Lemma 3.6. For all i ∈ N , ui(xi) > 0.
Proof. Regardless of the price curves, it is always possible for each agent to buy a nonzero amount
of each good and obtain nonzero utility. Since xi ∈ Di(g), xi must give agent i nonzero utility.
We next claim that for all goods with nonzero price, the intermediate allocation after Step 2 of
AT P(f) is equal to x, the allocation from the price curve equilibrium.
Lemma 3.7. For all i ∈ N , x′′ij = xij whenever gj 6≡ 0.
Proof. When gj 6≡ 0, bij = xij . Since each good is required by at least one agent, and ui(xi) > 0
for all i by Lemma 3.6, there exists k ∈ N where xkj > 0. Therefore bkj > 0, so we follow Step 1
of AT P’s allocation rule. Thus for all i ∈ N ,
x′′ij =
bij∑
k∈N bkj
sj
=
xij∑
k∈N xkj
sj
Since (x,g) is a PCE, Lemma 3.2 gives us
∑
k∈N xkj = sj whenever gj 6≡ 0. Therefore
x′′ij =
xij∑
k∈N xkj
sj = xij
as required.
The next lemma states that for all goods where some agent is bidding a positive amount, every
agent’s bundle in x′′ matches up exactly with her weights and her utility for xi.
Lemma 3.8. For all j ∈M where there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0, we have x
′′
ij = wijui(xi).
Proof. By the definition of b, if bkj > 0 for some k ∈ N , then gj 6≡ 0. Since (x,g) is a price
curve equilibrium, we then have xij = wijui(xi) by Lemma 3.2. Lemma 3.7 gives us x
′′
ij = xij, so
x′′ij = wijui(xi).
Next, we show that each agent’s utility for her bundle after Step 2 is equal to her utility for xi.
Lemma 3.9. For all i ∈ N , ui(x
′′
i ) = ui(xi).
Proof. It suffices to show that for all j ∈ Ri, x
′′
ij = ui(xi).
Case 1: j ∈ Ri and gj 6≡ 0. Lemma 3.7 implies that x
′′
ij = xij in this case. Since (x,g) is a price
curve equilibrium, Lemma 3.2 implies that xij = wijui(xi). Since wij = 1 for j ∈ Ri, x
′′
ij = ui(xi),
as required.
Case 2: j ∈ Ri and gj ≡ 0. If gj ≡ 0, the definition of b implies that all agents bid either β or
0 on j. Thus will be following Step 2 of AT P ’s allocation rule. By definition of b, bij = β in this
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case. Following Step 2 of the AT P allocation rule, let ℓi be a good with biℓi > 0: then x
′′
ij = x
′′
iℓi
.
Since biℓi > 0 by assumption, we have x
′′
iℓi
= wiℓiui(xi) by Lemma 3.8. Furthermore, biℓi > 0
implies x′′iℓi > 0, so wiℓiui(xi) > 0. Thus we must have wiℓi = 1, which implies x
′′
ij = x
′′
iℓi
= ui(xi).
Therefore x′′ij = ui(xi) for all j ∈ Ri, so ui(x
′′
i ) = ui(xi), as required.
The next lemma states that the intermediate allocation after Step 2 is equal to the final allo-
cation produced by AT P(f ,b).
Lemma 3.10. We have x′ = x′′.
Proof. We need to show that the penalty in Step 3 is not invoked. Suppose it is invoked: then there
is a good j allocated by Step 2 where
∑
i∈N x
′′
ij > sj . For each i ∈ N bidding β on good j, define
ℓi as usual: then x
′′
ij = x
′′
iℓi
. Since biℓi > 0, Lemma 3.8 implies that x
′′
iℓi
= wiℓiui(xi) whenever
bij = β.
sj <
∑
i∈N
x′′ij =
∑
i:bij=β
x′′iℓi =
∑
i:bij=β
wiℓiui(xi)
By definition of b, we must have gj ≡ 0: that is the only situation where agents bid β. Furthermore,
bij = β if and only if j ∈ Ri. Also using wiℓi ≤ 1 (in reality, wiℓi = 1 exactly, but we only need the
inequality), gives us
sj <
∑
i:j∈Ri
wiℓiui(xi) ≤
∑
i:j∈Ri
ui(xi)
Using wij = 1 if and only if j ∈ Ri then gives us
sj <
∑
i:j∈Ri
ui(xi) =
∑
i:j∈Ri
wijui(xi) =
∑
i∈N
wijui(xi)
By definition of ui, xij ≥ wijui(xi) for all j ∈M . Therefore∑
i∈N
xij ≥
∑
i∈N
wijui(xi) > sj
But this implies that x is not a valid allocation, which is a contradiction. We conclude that Step
3 is not invoked, and thus ui(x
′
i) = ui(x
′′
i ), which is equal to ui(xi) by Lemma 3.9.
Next, we show that the price curves constraint and bid constraint coincide.
Lemma 3.11. For all i ∈ N , Cf (bi) = Cg(xi).
Proof. By the definition of b, bij ∈ {0, β} when gj ≡ 0. Therefore:
Cf (bi) =
∑
j∈M
fj(bij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
fj(bij) +
∑
j:gj≡0
fj(bij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
fj(bij)
=
∑
j:gj 6≡0
gj(xij)
=
∑
j∈M
gj(xij)
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= Cg(xi)
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.2. Let h be any constraint curve. Let (x,g) be a price curve equilibrium, and define
f and b by
fj(b) =
{
h(b) if gj ≡ 0
gj(b) otherwise
bij =


β if gj ≡ 0 and j ∈ Ri
0 if gj ≡ 0 and j 6∈ Ri
xij otherwise
Then b is a Nash equilibrium of AT P(f).
Proof. Suppose (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium. By Lemma 3.2, we have Cg(xi) = 1 for all
i ∈ N . Thus Lemma 3.11 implies that Cf (bi) = 1 as well, which satisfies condition 2 of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.8 implies that x′′ij = wijui(xi) whenever there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0. Combining
this with Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10 gives us x′ij = wijui(x
′
i) whenever there exists k ∈ N with bkj > 0.
This satisfies condition 1 of Lemma 3.1. Therefore by Lemma 3.1, b is a Nash equilibrium of
AT P(f).
4 Nash-implementing CES welfare functions with trading post
In this section, we use the reduction between price curves and augmented trading post to show that
for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), AT P(ρ) Nash-implements CES welfare maximization. Recall that AT P(ρ)
is the augmented trading post mechanism where fj(b) = b
1−ρ for all j ∈M . Our key tools will be
the reduction from Section 3, and pair of lemmas from [20] regarding price curve equilibria. The
final result is Theorem 4.1:
Theorem 4.1. For any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), the mechanism AT P(ρ) Nash-implements the maximum
CES welfare social choice rule.
Before we can prove Theorem 4.1, we need one more property: Section 4.1 shows that scaling
the constraint curves does not affect the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We then prove the
main theorem in Section 4.2.
4.1 Nash equilibria of trading post are invariant to scaling of constraint curves
In order to use the reduction from Section 3, we would like to set fj(b) = gj(b) = qjb
1−ρ. However,
this would not be a valid mechanism: q1 . . . qm depend on the utility profile u, and the mechanism
cannot depend on u. In this section, we show that scaling by q1 . . . qm does not affect the Nash
equilibrium outcomes of AT P . This will allow us to use the mechanism AT P(ρ) instead, which
does not depend on u.
Recall that for the mechanism AT P(f), NE(AT P(f)) is the set of Nash equilibrium bids b,
and NEX(AT P(f)) is set of allocations x resulting from some b ∈ NE(AT P(f)).
Lemma 4.1. Let a1 . . . am be positive constants and let f be constraint curves where each fj is ho-
mogenous of degree αj > 0. Define f
′ by f ′j(b) = ajfj(b). Then NEX(AT P(f)) ⊆ NEX(AT P(f
′)).
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Proof. Let x be an arbitrary allocation in NEX(AT P(f)); we will show that x ∈ NEX(AT P(f
′)).
By definition, there exist bids b ∈ NE(AT P(f)) such that x = AT P(f ,b). Define b′ by b′ij =
a
−1/αj
j bij when bij > 0 and b
′
ij = bij otherwise. We first show that Cf ′(b
′) = Cf (b):∑
j∈M
f ′j(b
′
ij) =
∑
j∈M
ajfj(a
−1/αj
j bij) =
∑
j∈M
aj(a
−1/αj
j )
αjfj(bij) =
∑
j∈M
fj(bij)
Let x′ = AT P(f ′,b′). For any good j where b′kj > 0 for some k ∈ N (and thus also bkj > 0),
x′ij =
b′ij∑
k∈N b
′
kj
=
a
−1/αj
j bij∑
k∈N a
−1/αj
j bkj
=
bij∑
k∈N bkj
= xij
Thus for any good j where b′kj > 0 for some k ∈ N , we have x
′
ij = xij . For any good j where
b′kj ∈ {0, β} for all k, we also have bkj ∈ {0, β} for all k. Thus in both cases we follow Step 2 of
AT P ’s allocation rule. Since x′ij = xij for the good j where b
′
kj > 0 for some k, Step 2 results in
x′ij = xij for goods where b
′
kj ∈ {0, β} for all k. Therefore x
′ = x.
This implies that ui(xi) = ui(x
′
i) for all i ∈ N . Therefore xij = wijui(xi) if and only if x
′
ij =
wijui(x
′
i). Thus the conditions of Lemma 3.1 hold for b, f if and only if they hold for b
′, f ′. Therefore
since b ∈ NE(AT P(f)), we have b′ ∈ NE(AT P(f ′)), and thus x = x′ ∈ NEX(AT P(f
′)). We
conclude that NEX(AT P(f)) ⊆ NEX(AT P(f
′)).
Lemma 4.2. Let a1 . . . am be positive scalars and let f be constraint curves where each fj is ho-
mogenous of degree αj . Define f
′ by f ′j(b) = ajfj(b). Then NEX(AT P(f)) = NEX(AT P(f
′)).
Proof. Lemma 4.1 gives us NEX(AT P(f)) ⊆ NEX(AT P(f
′)), so it remains only to show that
NEX(AT P(f
′)) ⊆ NEX(AT P(f)). We can actually do this by symmetry. Define a
′
1 . . . a
′
m by
a′j = 1/aj . Then a
′
1 . . . a
′
m are positive scalars such that fj(b) = a
′
jf
′
j(b). Each f
′
j is also be
homogenous of degree αj :
f ′j(c · b) = ajfj(c · b) = c
αjajfj(b) = c
αjf ′j(b)
Then we can apply Lemma 4.1 with the roles of f ′ and f swapped to give us NEX(AT P(f
′)) ⊆
NEX(AT P(f)), which completes the proof.
4.2 Main theorem
The last tool we need is the following pair of lemmas, both due to [20]:
Lemma 4.3 ([20]). For utility profile u, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), and x ∈ Ψρ(u), there exist price curves
g such that (x,g) is a price curve equilibrium. Furthermore, for each j ∈ M , gj takes the form
gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ for some nonnegative constants q1 . . . qm.
Lemma 4.4 ([20]). Suppose ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) and that price curves g take the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ for
each j ∈M , for some nonnegative constants q1 . . . qm. Then if (x,g) is a PCE, x ∈ Ψρ(u).
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Lemma 4.3 states that for any maximum CES welfare allocation x, there exist price curves of
the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ where (x,g) is a PCE. Lemma 4.4 states the converse: if g takes the form
gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ for nonnegative constants q1 . . . qm, and (x,g) is a PCE, then x is a maximum CES
welfare allocation. Furthermore, q1 . . . qm are the Lagrange multipliers of the convex program for
maximizing CES welfare, so q1 . . . qm can be computed in polynomial time.
We are now finally ready to prove that AT P(ρ) Nash-implements Ψρ. We will make of the
follow results from previous sections:
1. Theorem 3.1: Any Nash equilibrium of AT P can be converted into an “equivalent” price
curve equilibrium.
2. Theorem 3.2: Any price curve equilibrium can be converted into an “equivalent” Nash equi-
librium of AT P .
3. Lemma 4.2: The set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of AT P is invariant to constant scaling
of the constraint curves.
4. Lemma 4.3 [20]: For any maximum CES welfare allocation x, there exist price curves g of
the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ such that (x,g) is a PCE.
5. Lemma 4.4 [20]: If there exist price curves g of the form gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ such that (x,g) is a
PCE, then x is a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Recall that for a utility profile u, the induced game of mechanism AT P(ρ) is denoted by
AT P(ρ)(u). We left u implicit when dealing with Nash equilibria in previous sections, but we
make it explicit here.
Theorem 4.1. For any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), the mechanism AT P(ρ) Nash-implements the maximum
CES welfare social choice rule.
Proof. We need to show that for any utility profile u, ∅ 6= NEX(AT P(ρ)(u)) ⊆ Ψρ(u): in words, for
any u, there is at least one Nash equilibrium, and every Nash equilibrium allocation of AT P(ρ)(u)
is a maximum CES welfare allocation with respect to ρ and u.
Pick any x∗ ∈ Ψρ(u), and define q1 . . . qm and g as in Lemma 4.3. Define f by fj(b) = qjb
1−ρ
when qj 6= 0, and fj(b) = b
1−ρ when qj = 0. By Lemma 4.2, we have NEX(AT P(ρ)(u)) =
NEX(AT P(f)(u)). Thus it suffices to show that ∅ 6= NEX(AT P(f)(u)) ⊆ Ψρ(u).
We first show that NEX(AT P(f)(u)) 6= ∅, i.e., AT P(f)(u) has at least one Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.3, (x∗,g) is a PCE. Since gj(x) = qjx
1−ρ by Lemma 4.3, we have fj(b) = gj(b)
whenever qj 6= 0 (which is equivalent to gj ≡ 0). When gj ≡ 0, fj(b) = b
1−ρ, which is strictly
increasing. Thus f satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.2. If we define b as a function of x∗ as
in Theorem 3.2, then by Theorem 3.2, b ∈ NE(AT P(f)(u)). Therefore AT P(f)(u) has at least
one Nash equilibrium.
It remains to show that NEX(AT P(f)(u)) ⊆ Ψρ(u), i.e., every Nash equilibrium outcome of
AT P(f)(u) is a maximum CES welfare allocation. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ NEX(AT P(f)(u)).
Then there exists b ∈ NE(AT P(f)(u)) such that x = AT P(f ,b). Noting that each fj is homoge-
nous of degree 1− ρ, define g′ as a function of f and a1 . . . am as a function of b as in Theorem 3.1:
aj =
(∑
k∈N bkj
sj
)1−ρ
and g′j(x) =
{
0 if bij ∈ {0, β} ∀i ∈ N
ajfj(x) otherwise
By Theorem 3.1, (x,g′) is a PCE. Furthermore, we can write each g′j as g
′
j(x) = q
′
jx
1−ρ for
nonnegative constants q′1 . . . q
′
m. Therefore by Lemma 4.4, x ∈ Ψρ(u).
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Thus we have shown that x ∈ Ψρ(u) for all x ∈ NEX(AT P(f)(u)), so NEX(AT P(ρ)(u)) ⊆
Ψρ(u). Since NEX(AT P(ρ)(u)) = NEX(AT P(f)(u)), we conclude that ∅ 6= NEX(AT P(ρ)(u)) ⊆
Ψρ(u).
Finally, we note that a Nash equilibrium b ∈ NE(AT P(ρ)(u)) can be computed in polynomial
time. Since q1 . . . qm are the Lagrange multipliers of the convex program for maximizing CES
welfare, they can be computed in polynomial time. Then Theorem 3.2 can be applied to obtain
b′ ∈ NE(AT P(f)(u)), and finally Lemma 4.2 yields an equivalent b ∈ NE(AT P(ρ)(u)).
4.2.1 Maskin’s approach and no veto power
As discussed in Section 1.3, Maskin proved that in a very general environment, any social choice
rule satisfying monotonicity and no veto power is Nash-implementable [25]. We briefly show that
bandwidth allocation does not satisfy no veto power for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], and thus is not conducive
to Maskin’s approach.
Definition 4.1. A social choice rule Ψ satisfies no veto power if whenever there exists an allocation
x where for all i ∈ N except at most 1, ui(xi) ≥ ui(yi) for all allocations y, we have x ∈ Ψ(u).
In words, if there is a single allocation that everyone (except at most one agent) agrees is their
favorite, then that allocation should be optimal under Ψ (the last agent should not be able to
“veto” this allocation). In general, agents will not agree on a favorite allocation: each agent would
like to receive all of the resources herself. However, when agents’ Ri sets are pairwise disjoint, it is
possible for all agents to agree on a favorite allocation.
Consider an instance with n agents and n goods, each with supply 1. For all i ∈ N , let Ri = {i}:
each agent just desires a single good. Consider the allocation x where for all i ∈ {1 . . . n−1}, xii = 1,
but xnn = 0 (and xij = 0 otherwise). For agents 1 . . . n−1, this is the most utility they can possibly
get, so this satisfies the precondition of Definition 4.1. However, for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], x 6∈ Ψρ(u),
because the CES welfare can be improved by increasing xnn. Specifically, for every ρ, the unique
optimal CES allocation has xii = 1 for all i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
5 Dominant strategy implementation, strategyproofness, and maxmin
welfare
In Section 4, we showed that for every ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), CES welfare maximization is Nash-implementable.
A natural question to ask is whether this result can be improved to dominant strategy equilib-
rium implementation (DSE implementation, for short). In Section 5.1, we show that for every
ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], Ψρ is not DSE-implementable (Theorem 5.1). In contrast, Section 5.2 shows that
maxmin welfare (ρ = −∞) is in fact DSE-implementable by a simple revelation mechanism (Theo-
rem 5.2). Finally, Section 5.3 uses a more complex mechanism to show that maxmin welfare is also
Nash-implementable (Theorem 5.3).
Review of relevant concepts. An important property related to DSE implementation is strat-
egyproofness. Recall that a mechanism is strategyproof when honestly reporting one’s preferences
is always a dominant strategy. As discussed in Section 2.3, DSE-implementability implies strate-
gyproofness by the revelation principle, but the converse is not necessarily true: strategyproofness
ensures that truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium, but there could also be bad dom-
inant strategy equilibria. For our positive result DSE result (Theorem 5.2), we will show that
23
our mechanism is strategyproof, and also that there are no bad dominant strategy equilibria. For
our negative DSE result (Theorem 5.1), we show that the social choice rule in question is not
strategyproof, which implies that it is not DSE-implementable.
Furthermore, as also discussed in Section 2.3, DSE-implementability does not imply Nash-
implementability: DSE-implementability requires every DSE to be consistent with Ψ, but the
mechanism might have additional (non-DSE) Nash equilibria that are not consistent with Ψ. In
fact, our DSE implementation of maxmin welfare is not a Nash implementation: it may have
Nash equilibria that are not optimal (see Section 5.2.1). In Section 5.3, we give a more complex
mechanism that does Nash-implement maxmin welfare (Theorem 5.3).
We briefly discuss a subtlety relating to uniqueness (and lack thereof). In a sense, all strat-
egyproof mechanisms that implement a social choice rule Ψ are the same: they all ask agents to
report their utility functions u1 . . . un, then compute an outcome x ∈ Ψ(u)
23. However, if Ψ(u)
contains multiple elements (i.e., there are multiple optimal allocations), it may matter which is
chosen. If leftover supply is allocated arbitrarily, it can be hard to reason about the optimal allo-
cation under different utility profiles. Furthermore, not even the optimal vector of agent utilities is
unique for maxmin welfare and utilitarian welfare (although it is for ρ ∈ (−∞, 1)).
Consequently, for both of our positive results (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3), we will specify our
mechanism such that it selects a unique allocation for each utility profile u (even when they are
multiple optimal allocations). For our negative result (Theorem 5.1), we will give an instance where
an agent lying makes her utility in every new optimal allocation strictly larger than her utility in
every optimal allocation under a truthful report.
5.1 For all ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], CES welfare maximization is not DSE-implementable
To show impossibility of DSE implementation, it is sufficient to show impossibility of strategyproof-
ness. Our counterexample will be the following instance with 5 agents and 7 goods, where each
row is an agent, each column is a good, and the cell in the ith row and jth column gives wij:
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7
agent 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
agent 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
agent 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
agent 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
agent 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Let the supply of good 7 be 2, and let all other goods have supply 1. Notice that agents 1,
2, and 3 all conflict on good 7, but otherwise are not in competition. Agents 4 and 5 are not in
competition with each other, but each conflicts with each of agents 1, 2, and 3. Let u denote this
utility profile, and u′ denote the utility profile where R′4 = {1, 3, 5, 7} instead of R4 = {1, 3, 5}, and
all other utilities are unchanged. We will claim that under utility profile u, agent 4 can increase
her utility by misreporting R′4 instead of R4.
We will prove this using two main lemmas. Lemma 5.1 states that when agent 4 truthfully
reports R4, her utility is strictly less than 1/2. Lemma 5.3 states that when agent 4 lies and
reports R′4 instead, her utility is at least 1/2 (Lemma 5.2 is a tool used in the proof of Lemma 5.3).
Note that each lemma is referring to agent 4’s true utility function u4.
Lemma 5.1. For every ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], every x ∈ Ψρ(u) has u4(x4) < 1/2.
23This is in the setting where no payments are involved, like this paper. If payments are allowed, these mechanisms
can of course differ in what agents are asked to pay.
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Proof. For ρ = 0, an optimal Nash welfare allocation can be computed explicitly, and any such
allocation x will have u4(x4) < 1/2. Recall that although the optimal allocation may not be unique,
the optimal utility vector is, since Nash welfare is strictly concave.
Let A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {4, 5}. For ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], we write the following convex
program for maximizing CES welfare:
max
u1,u2,u3,u4,u5∈R≥0
(uρ1 + u
ρ
2 + u
ρ
3 + u
ρ
4 + u
ρ
5)
1/ρ
s.t. ui + uk ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ B
u1 + u2 + u3 ≤ 2
We are using ui as a variable in the convex program, but we will reserve ui(xi) to denote agent i’s
utility for x ∈ Ψρ(u).
By construction, for every i ∈ A and k ∈ B, there is a good such j such that xij+xkj ≤ 1 where
wij = wkj = 1. This implies that for any x ∈ Ψρ(u), ui(xi) + uk(xk) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ A and k ∈ B.
Similarly, the supply constraint of good 7 implies that u1(x1) + u2(x2) + u3(x3) ≤ 2. Furthermore,
any such allocation is indeed feasible: simply let xij = wijui(xi) for all i ∈ N . This means that the
set of possible utilities for feasible allocations is equal to the set of feasible solutions u1 . . . u5 to the
above convex program. Thus this program correctly maximizes CES welfare. This implies that for
every x ∈ Ψρ(u), there exists an optimal solution to the above convex program u
∗
1 . . . u
∗
5 such that
ui(xi) = u
∗
i for all i ∈ N . We proceed by case analysis.
Case 1: u∗1 + u
∗
2 + u
∗
3 = 2. In this case, one of those three agents must have utility at least 2/3.
Since agent 4 is in competition with each of those agents for a good with supply 1, this implies that
u∗4 = 1/3 < 1/2.
Case 2: u∗1+ u
∗
2+ u
∗
3 6= 2. Because of the convex program’s second constraint, u
∗
1+ u
∗
2+ u
∗
3 > 2
is not feasible, so we must have u∗1 + u
∗
2 + u
∗
3 < 2. In this case, the convex program above reduces
to:
max
u1,u2,u3,u4,u5∈R≥0
(uρ1 + u
ρ
2 + u
ρ
3 + u
ρ
4 + u
ρ
5)
1/ρ
s.t. ui + uk ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ B
We next claim that there exists u∗A and u
∗
B such that u
∗
i = u
∗
A for all i ∈ A, and u
∗
k = u
∗
B for all
i ∈ B. Suppose there exists i, i′ ∈ A such that u∗i < u
∗
i′ . Then we could increase u
∗
1 while still
obeying the constraints of this program, and increase 1ρ(u
ρ
1+u
ρ
2+u
ρ
3+u
ρ
4+u
ρ
5). That would imply
that u∗1 . . . u
∗
5 could not be optimal. Furthermore, an identical argument applies to the agents in b.
Therefore there exists u∗A and u
∗
B such that u
∗
i = u
∗
A for all i ∈ A, and u
∗
k = u
∗
B for all i ∈ B,
so we can further rewrite the convex program as
max
uA,uB∈R≥0
(3uρA + 2u
ρ
B)
1/ρ
s.t. uA + uB ≤ 1
where (u∗A, u
∗
B) is the optimal solution of this program. Clearly we must have u
∗
B = 1 − u
∗
A.
Furthermore, we claim that we can change the objective function from (3uρA + 2u
ρ
B)
1/ρ to 1ρ(3u
ρ
A +
2uρB), and that this changes the optimal value of the program, but does not change the optimal
solution, i.e., the argmax. This because when ρ > 0, maximizing (3uρA + 2u
ρ
B)
1/ρ is equivalent to
maximizing 3uρA + 2u
ρ
B , and when ρ < 0, maximizing (3u
ρ
A + 2u
ρ
B)
1/ρ is equivalent to minimizing
3uρA + 2u
ρ
B , which is equivalent to maximizing
1
ρ(3u
ρ
A + 2u
ρ
B). Thus our new convex program is
max
uA∈[0,1]
1
ρ
(3uρA + 2(1 − uA)
ρ)
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This is a program we can analyze. For ρ = 1, the objective function becomes uA + 2, so we
immediately have u∗A = 1 and thus u
∗
4 = u
∗
B = 0. For ρ < 1, we take the derivative with respect to
uA should be 0 when evaluated at u
∗
A:
3u∗A
ρ−1 − 2(1− u∗A)
ρ−1 = 0
3u∗A
ρ−1 = 2(1 − u∗A)
ρ−1
3
1
ρ−1u∗A = 2
1
ρ−1 (1− u∗A)
(3
1
ρ−1 + 2
1
ρ−1 )u∗A = 2
1
ρ−1
u∗A =
2
1
ρ−1
3
1
ρ−1 + 2
1
ρ−1
u∗A =
1
(3/2)
1
ρ−1 + 1
Since ρ < 1, ρ − 1 is negative, so 1ρ−1 is negative. Then since 3/2 > 1, (3/2)
1
ρ−1 < 1. Altogether,
this implies that
u∗1 = u
∗
2 = u
∗
3 = u
∗
A > 1/2 and u
∗
4 = u
∗
5 = u
∗
B < 1/2
as required.
The following lemma is a standard property of strictly concave and differentiable functions: it
essentially states that any such function is bounded above by any tangent line. This lemma is
sometimes called the “Rooftop Theorem”. To avoid confusion with u′ and x′, we use Dh to denote
the derivative of h, instead of h′ (this is Euler’s notation for derivatives).
Lemma 5.2. Let h : R → R be strictly concave and differentiable. Then for all a, b ∈ R where
a 6= b, h(a) < h(b) + (Dh(b))(a − b).
Lemma 5.3. For any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], for any x′ ∈ Ψρ(u
′), u4(x
′
4) ≥ 1/2.
Proof. It suffices to show that u′4(x
′
4) ≥ 1/2: since R4 ⊂ R
′
4, we have
u4(x
′
4) = min
j∈R4
x′4j ≥ min
j∈R′
4
x′4j = u
′
4(x
′
4)
For ρ = 1, the set of optimal allocations can be computed explicitly to see that for all x′ ∈ Ψρ=1(u
′),
u′i(x
′
i) = 1/2 for all i ∈ N .
We now use this to show that for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), for any x′ ∈ Ψρ(u
′), u′i(x
′
i) = 1/2 for all
i ∈ N . Intuitively, the larger ρ is, the more we care about efficiency and the less we care about
fairness. But if the most efficient solution (i.e., the optimal allocation for ρ = 1) coincides with
the most fair solution (i.e., having all utilities equal), then no matter how much we care about
efficiency vs fairness, we should get the same outcome.
Let x∗ be any allocation in Ψρ=1(u
′): then u′i(x
∗
i ) = 1/2 for all i ∈ N . Fix a ρ ∈ (−∞, 1)
and let h(a) = 1ρa
ρ if ρ 6= 0, and h(a) = log(a) if ρ = 1. In both of these h is strictly concave
and differentiable. Consider any allocation y where for some i ∈ N , ui(yi) 6= 1/2. For brevity, let
u′∗i = u
′
i(x
∗
i ) and u
′y
i = u
′
i(yi).
For all such i, Lemma 5.2 implies that h(u′yi ) < h(u
′∗
i )+(Dh(u
′∗
i ))(u
′y
i −u
′∗
i ) for u
′∗
i 6= u
′y
i . When
u′yi = 1/2 = u
′∗
i , we have h(u
′y
i ) = h(u
′∗
i ) + (Dh(u
′∗
i ))(u
′y
i − u
′∗
i ) = 0. Thus for ρ 6= 0, we have∑
i∈N
1
ρ
(u′yi )
ρ
=
∑
i∈N
h(u′yi )
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<
∑
i∈N
(
h(u′∗i ) + (Dh(u
′∗
i ))(u
′y
i − u
′∗
i )
)
=
∑
i∈N
(1
ρ
(u′∗i )
ρ
+ (Dh(1/2))(u′yi − u
′∗
i )
)
=
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
(u′∗i )
ρ
+
∑
i∈N
(Dh(1/2))(u′yi − u
′∗
i )
=
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
(u′∗i )
ρ
+ (Dh(1/2))
(∑
i∈N
u′yi −
∑
i∈N
u′∗i
)
Since x∗ ∈ Ψρ=1(u
′),
∑
i∈N u
′∗
i ≥
∑
i∈N u
′y
i . Therefore (Dh(1/2))
(∑
i∈N u
′y
i −
∑
i∈N u
′∗
i
)
≤ 0, so
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
(u′yi )
ρ
<
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
(u′∗i )
ρ
As before, this implies that
(∑
i∈N (u
′y
i )
ρ)1/ρ
<
(∑
i∈N (u
′∗
i )
ρ)1/ρ. The analysis for ρ = 0 (i.e.,
Nash welfare) is the same, except we end up with
∑
i∈N log(u
′y
i ) <
∑
i∈N log(u
′∗
i ) instead, which
implies
∏
i∈N u
′y
i <
∏
i∈N u
′∗
i .
Thus for any allocation y where there exists i ∈ N with u′i(yi) 6= 1/2, the CES welfare of x
∗
is better than the CES welfare of y. This implies that for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], any x′ ∈ Ψρ(u
′) must
have u′i(x
′
i) = 1/2 for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 5.1. For all ρ ∈ (−∞, 1], Ψρ is not DSE-implementable.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2, it suffices to show that Ψρ cannot be computed in
a strategyproof mechanism. Suppose there were a strategyproof mechanism H: then for utility
profile u, H must return an allocation x ∈ Ψρ(u), and for utility profile u
′, H must return an
allocation x′ ∈ Ψρ(u
′). By Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3, we have u4(x4) < 1/2 and u4(x
′
4) ≥ 1/2. If agent
4 reports R′4 = {1, 3, 5, 7} instead of R4 = {1, 3, 5}, she alters the utility profile from u to u
′, which
resulting in her receiving a bundle with higher utility. Therefore H is not strategyproof.
5.2 Maxmin welfare is DSE-implementable
We will claim that Mechanism 1 DSE-implements maxmin welfare. We are using ui as a variable in
the convex program in Step 2, but we will reserve ui(xi) for denoting agent i’s utility for a bundle
xi. We could have used ui ≥ γ and uiwij ≤ xij for our first two constraints, but requiring ui = γ
and uiwij = xij ensures a unique solution (and does not affect the optimal value).
We say that an allocation x is maxmin-optimal if the minimum utility in x is the largest possible
minimum utility among all valid allocations. Formally, mini∈N ui(xi) = maxx′ mini∈N ui(x
′
i).
Lemma 5.4. Assume agents truthfully report their desired sets of goods. Then Mechanism 1
correctly computes a maxmin-optimal allocation.
Proof. Let x be the allocation returned by Mechanism 1, and suppose there exists y such that
mink∈N uk(yk) > mink∈N uk(xk). Consider the allocation x
′ where x′ij = wijmink∈N uk(yk) for all
i, j. Then ui(x
′
i) = mink∈N uk(yk) for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, yij ≥ wijui(yi) by definition of
ui(yi), and ui(yi) ≥ ui(x
′
i), so
yij ≥ wijui(yi) ≥ wijui(x
′
i) = x
′
ij
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Mechanism 1 A simple revelation mechanism which DSE-implements maxmin welfare.
1. Ask each agent i report her set of desired goods Ri (which fully specifies her utility function
ui and her weights wi1 . . . wim).
2. Let (x∗,u∗) be an optimal solution the following convex program:
max
x∈Rn×m
≥0
,
u=(u1...un)∈Rn≥0
γ
s.t. ui = γ ∀i ∈ N
uiwij = xij ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M∑
i∈N
xij ≤ sj ∀j ∈M
3. Return the allocation x∗.
Thus since y is a valid allocation, so is x′. Therefore x′ is feasible for our convex program, and
mini∈N ui(x
′
i) = mini∈N ui(yi) > mini∈N ui(xi), so x could not have been an optimal solution to
our convex program.
Lemma 5.5. Mechanism 1 is strategyproof.
Proof. Let R1 . . . Rn be the true desired sets of goods. Suppose for sake of contradiction that there
exists an instance where an agent i can increase her utility by reporting some R′i 6= Ri. Let xi and
x′i be agent i’s bundles when she reports Ri and R
′
i, respectively (assuming other agents make the
same reports in both cases). Due to the constraint uiwij = xij , our mechanism will set x
′
ij = 0 for
all j 6∈ R′i. If R
′
i ( Ri, then there exists a j ∈ Ri where j 6∈ R
′
i. Thus x
′
ij = 0, which implies that
ui(x
′
i) = 0, since j ∈ Ri.
Suppose Ri ( R
′
i, and let w
′
i1 . . . w
′
im be the weights associated with R
′
i. In this case, there exists
a j ∈ R′i \ Ri, so w
′
ij = 1 and wij = 0. We claim that any utility vector u1 . . . un that is feasible
in the original program (when agent i reports Ri) is also feasible in the new program (when agent
i reports R′i). Let xkj = ukwkj and x
′
kj = ukw
′
kj. Since w
′
kj ≥ wkj for all k, j, we have x
′
kj ≥ xkj
for all j ∈ M , so
∑
k∈N xkj ≤
∑
k∈N x
′
kj ≤ sj. Thus if x
′ and u1 . . . un are feasible together, so
are x and u1 . . . un. This means that the optimal value of the new program is at most the optimal
value of the original program: the objective functions are the same, and the feasible set for the
new program is a subset of that of the original program. Since each agent’s utility is equal to the
objective value of the convex program, this means that agent i’s utility when she reports R′i cannot
improve.
Thus we have shown that reporting R′i 6= Ri cannot improve agent i’s utility. We conclude that
this mechanism is strategyproof.
Theorem 5.2. Mechanism 1 DSE-implements maxmin welfare.
Proof. Lemma 5.5 implies that there is at least one DSE: in particular, truthful revelation is a DSE.
Thus it remains only to show that there are no “bad” dominant strategy equilibria, i.e., every DSE
results in a maxmin-optimal allocation.
We claim that in any DSE, the vector of utilities is the same as in the truthful DSE, which we
know has optimal maxmin welfare by Lemma 5.4. Since this is a revelation mechanism, each agent
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just reports a utility function ui. Let u = u1 . . . un be the true utility profile, and let u
′ = u′1 . . . u
′
n
be an arbitrary DSE. Since the mechanism is strategyproof, we know that u is also a DSE. Thus
for every agent i, ui and u
′
i are both dominant strategies (it is possible that ui = u
′
i).
For each r ∈ {1 . . . n + 1}, define another utility profile ur where each agent i ∈ {1 . . . r − 1}
reports ui and each agent i ∈ {r . . . n} reports u
′
i. Suppose every agent is reporting according to
ur. If agent r switches from reporting u′r to truthfully reporting ur, she alters the utility profile
from ur to ur+1. Let xr and xr+1 be the resulting allocations for reported utility profiles ur and
ur+1, respectively. Since reporting ur and reporting u
′
r are both dominant strategies for agent r,
she must be indifferent between xr and xr+1 (according to her true utility function, ur). Formally,
ur(x
r
r) = ur(x
r+1
r ).
Next, by the definition of the mechanism, each agent has the same utility for her resulting bundle
(according to the utility function she reports). Let γr be every agent’s utility for the allocation xr,
according to her reported utility function uri : u
r
i (x
r
i ) = γ
r. Our next claim is that ui(x
r
i ) = γ
r, i.e.,
each agent’s true utility for xr is γr. As before, we know that Ri ⊆ R
′
i for each agent i: reporting
R′i ( Ri always results in getting zero utility. This means that Ri ⊆ R
r
i . Furthermore, the convex
program ensures that each agent i receives the same amount of every good in her reported set Rri .
Thus we have
uri (x
r
i ) = min
j∈Rri
xrij = min
j∈Ri
xrij = ui(x
r
i )
Therefore ui(x
r
i ) = γ
r, i.e., each agent’s true utility for xr is γr. In particular, ur(x
r
r) = γ
r and
ur(x
r+1
r ) = γ
r+1.
We showed above that ur(x
r
r) = ur(x
r+1
r ), so we now have γ
r+1 = γr for all r. This implies
γ1 = γn+1. Thus each agent’s true utility for x1 (which is γ1) is the same as each agent’s true
utility for xn+1 (which is γn+1). By definition, xn+1 is the resulting allocation when each agent
truthfully reports ui, and x
1 is the resulting allocation when each agent reports u′i. Thus we have
shown that each agent’s utility is the same in these two allocations.
Since u′ was an arbitrary DSE, we have shown that in any DSE, every agent’s utility is the same
as in the truthful outcome. Therefore the outcome of any DSE is a maxmin-optimal allocation.
5.2.1 The above mechanism does not Nash-implement maxmin welfare
In this section, we show that our DSE implementation of maxmin welfare is not a Nash implemen-
tation, i.e., there may be Nash equilibria that are not optimal. Consider an instance with n agents
and n goods, where each agent i’s true set of desired goods is Ri = {i}. Assume each good has
supply 1. The unique maxmin-optimal allocation has xii = 1 for all i ∈ N and xij = 0 for j 6= i,
i.e., it gives the entirety of each good to the unique agent who desires it. This results in each agent
having utility 1, and thus maxmin welfare of 1.
Now consider the strategy profile where each agent i reports that she desires every good, i.e.,
reports M . The resulting allocation will give each agent exactly 1/n of each good, resulting in
each agent’s utility (according to her true utility function) being 1/n. We claim that this is a Nash
equilibrium. Suppose an agent i reports R′i instead of M . If R
′
i = ∅, agent i receives nothing, so
that cannot increase her utility. Thus let j be any good in R′i. Since the other n − 1 agents are
also reporting that they desire good j, our mechanism would divide j evenly across all the agents,
resulting in agent i receiving xij = 1/n. Since our mechanism gives each agent equal the same
quantity of each good in their reported set, agent i does not receive more than 1/n of any good, so
her utility is at most 1/n (in fact, it will be exactly 1/n). Thus agent i cannot improve her utility
by bidding some R′i 6=M , so the strategy profile where each agent reportsM is a Nash equilibrium.
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Furthermore, the maxmin welfare is 1/n, which is actually a factor of n worse than the optimal
maxmin welfare of 1.
5.3 Maxmin welfare is Nash-implementable
Our Nash implementation of maxmin welfare will use some of the same intuition from our DSE
implementation. However, we will have to be careful to avoid bad equilibria like the one described
in Section 5.2.1. Let H denote Mechanism 1 (which DSE-implements maxmin welfare), and let
HX(u) denote the allocation produced by H when the reported utility profile is u.
Mechanism 2 operates as follows. First, it asks each agent to report not only her own utility
function, but the utility function of every agent. Recall that the utility function is specified by the
set of desired goods; hence, agent i reports R1(i) . . . Rn(i), where Rk(i) is the set of goods that
agent i says agent k desires.
Step 2 defines ηi and N¯ , which will be used later to penalize agents in a way that aligns
incentives. The scalar ηi denotes the number of agents k where what agent i says that agent k
wants (Rk(i)) conflicts what agent k says that she wants (Rk(k)). We will penalize agents for
having large values of ηi to incentivize them to come to a consensus. The set N¯ contains the set
of agents i where for some other agent k, agent i is saying that agent k wants more goods than
agent k is saying that she actually wants (i.e., Rk(k) ( Rk(i)). We will penalize this specific type
of disagreement more strongly; the reason will become clear in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Step 3 defines αi ∈ [0, 1]: αi = 1 represents no penalty, and αi = 0 represents an absolute
penalty (i.e., that agent will end up with no utility). Specifically, αi = 0 for each agent in N¯ , and
for those agents not in N¯ , a higher ηi leads to a higher penalty. Next, we use the mechanism H to
compute a maxmin-optimal allocation x′ ignoring agents in N¯ . It is crucial that we ignore those
agents when computing this allocation. Finally, we return an allocation x which is just x′ with the
αi penalties applied. As usual, xi and yi are vectors in R
m
≥0.
The first thing to notice is that we have solved the problem from Section 5.2.1. We claim that
each agent i reporting Rk(i) = M for all k ∈ N is not longer a Nash equilibrium when agent i’s
true desired set is a strict subset of M . This is because if agent i shrinks Ri(i) to her true subset,
but reports Rk(i) = M for all k 6= i, N¯ will contain every agent except for her. This means that
she would get all of the resources in Step 3, which clearly increases her utility. The other agents
would then respond by setting Ri(k) = Ri(i) so that they are no longer in N¯ , but this at least
shows that Rk(i) =M for all i, k ∈ N is not a Nash equilibrium.
Mechanism 2 A mechanism which Nash-implements maxmin welfare.
1. Ask each agent i to report R1(i) . . . Rn(i), where Rk(i) ⊆M for each k ∈ N .
2. For each i ∈ N , let ηi = |{k ∈ N : Rk(k) 6= Rk(i)}|. Define the set N¯ by N¯ = {i ∈ N : ∃k ∈
N s.t. Rk(k) ( Rk(i)}.
3. For each i ∈ N , define αi ∈ [0, 1] as follows. If i ∈ N¯ , then αi = 0. Otherwise, let αi = 1−ηi/n.
4. Let u be the utility profile where the set of goods desired by agent i is Ri(i) if i 6∈ N¯ , and is
∅ if i ∈ N¯ . Let y = HX(u).
5. Return the allocation x where for each i ∈ N , xi = αiyi.
For the rest of this section, we will use R˜ = R˜1 . . . R˜n to denote the true desired sets of goods,
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and u˜ = u˜1 . . . u˜n to denote the corresponding utility profile.
Lemma 5.6. When each agent reports R˜, Mechanism 2 returns a maxmin-optimal allocation.
Proof. In this case, we have N¯ = ∅ and αi = 1 for all i ∈ N . Thus the u used in Step 4 is the true
utility profile, so H computes a maxmin-optimal y allocation with respect to the true preferences.
Since αi = 1 for all i ∈ N , we have x = y, so Mechanism 2 does indeed return a maxmin-optimal
allocation.
Lemma 5.7. The strategy profile where each agent reports R˜ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose the opposite: then there exists an agent i who can report R′1(i) . . . R
′
n(i) and in-
crease her utility. When all agents report R˜, let α˜i be agent i’s value of αi, let y˜ be the intermediate
allocation produced in Step 4, and let x˜ be the final resulting allocation. When agent i reports
R′1(i) . . . R
′
n(i) and all other agents report R˜, we use α
′
i, y
′, and x′ analogously.
Thus we have assumed that u˜i(x
′
i) > u˜i(x˜i), i.e., she is strictly happier when she deviates and
reports R′1(i) . . . R
′
n(i). Since x
′
i = α
′
iy
′
i and x˜i = α˜iy˜i, we have u˜i(α
′
iy
′
i) > u˜i(α˜iy˜i). When all agents
report R˜, all agents are in agreement, so α˜i = 1. Since α
′
i ≤ 1, we have α
′
i ≤ α˜i. Therefore we
must have u˜i(y
′
i) > u˜i(y˜i).
We claim that after this deviation, N¯ = ∅. If i ∈ N¯ , she receives zero utility, so such a deviation
could not help her. Since all agents k 6= i report the same thing, the only way for agent k 6= i to
be in N¯ is if what agent k is reporting that agent i wants (which in this case is R˜i) is a superset of
what agent i is reporting that she wants (which in this case is R′i(i)). If R
′
i(i) ( R˜i, then there is a
good j ∈ R˜i that agent i will receive none of, i.e., y
′
ij = 0. This is because the convex program in
H will only allocate agent i a portion of good j if good j is in her reported set. Thus R′i(i) ( R˜i
implies that u˜i(y
′
i) = 0. Therefore agent i’s utility cannot have improved, which is a contradiction.
Therefore after the deviation, N¯ = ∅. This means that y′ is just the maxmin-optimal allocation
computed by Mechanism 1 for utility profile R˜1, R˜2 . . . R
′
i(i) . . . R˜n. But this implies that agent i
is improving her utility for the allocation produced by Mechanism 1 by reporting R′i(i) instead of
R˜i. This contradicts the strategyproofness of Mechanism 1 (by Lemma 5.5). Thus u˜i(y
′
i) > u˜i(y˜i)
is impossible, which implies that each agent reporting R˜ is in fact a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.3. Mechanism 2 Nash-implements maxmin welfare.
Proof. We need to show that for each problem instance, Mechanism 2 has at least one Nash equilib-
rium, and every Nash equilibrium is optimal. Lemma 5.7 implies that at least one Nash equilibrium
exists, so it remains to show that every Nash equilibrium results in a maxmin-optimal allocation.
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium where agent i reports R1(i) . . . Rn(i). First, note that
each agent i can always achieve i 6∈ N¯ and αi = 1 by having Rk(i) = Rk(k) for each k 6= i. This
also does not restrict what she reports for Ri(i), which is what actually affects the allocation y.
Thus in any Nash equilibrium, we have N¯ = ∅, αi = 1 for all i ∈ N , and Rk(i) = Rk(k) for all
i, k ∈ N .
SinceH allocates a portion of good j to agent i only if j is in agent i’s reported set, if Ri(i) ( R˜i,
then agent i will receive zero utility. ReportingRi(i) = R˜i instead (and still reportingRk(i) = Rk(k)
for k 6= i, so that she is not in N¯) would give her nonzero utility, so Ri(i) ( R˜i is impossible in a
Nash equilibrium. Thus we must have R˜i ⊆ Ri(i) for all i ∈ N .
Now suppose that R˜i ( Ri(i). Suppose that agent i reports R
′
i(i) = R˜i instead (and reports
the same Rk(i) for each k 6= i). Then since every agent k 6= i is reporting Ri(k) = Ri(i), we now
have R′i(i) ( Ri(k) for each k 6= i. This means that N¯ contains every agent except for i, so every
agent other than i is ignored when computing the allocation y. This means that the allocation y
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gives agent i her maximum possible utility (which is minj∈R˜i sj: the minimum supply of any good
she desires). Since agent i is still reporting Rk(i) = Rk(k) for all k 6= i, she still has αi = 1, which
means that in the final allocation x, she receives her maximum possible utility.
Therefore in any Nash equilibrium, for each i ∈ N , either Ri(i) = R˜i (i.e., she is reporting her
true set), or R˜i ( Ri(i) and agent i is receiving her maximum possible utility. We proceed by case
analysis.
Case 1: Every agent agent is reporting Ri(i) = R˜i. Since we have Rk(i) = Rk(k) for all i, k ∈ N ,
each agent must be reporting R˜. Then by Lemma 5.6, we get a maxmin-optimal allocation in this
case.
Case 2: At least one agent i is reporting R˜i ( Ri(i) and thus is receiving her maximum possible
utility of minj∈R˜i sj. Let γ = minj∈R˜i sj: then for any allocation x
′,
min
k∈N
uk(x
′
k) ≤ ui(x
′
i) ≤ γ
i.e., the value of the maxmin objective can never be more than γ. Since H gives each agent the
same utility (according to her reported preferences), for all k ∈ N we have
γ = min
j∈Rk(k)
xkj ≥ min
j∈R˜k
= u˜k(xk)
where the inequality is because R˜i ⊆ Ri(i). Thus we have mink∈N u˜k(xk) = γ. Thus x must be
maxmin-optimal.
Therefore we have shown that in either case, the Nash equilibrium must result in a maxmin-
optimal allocation. We conclude that Mechanism 2 Nash-implements maxmin welfare.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we showed that every CES welfare function except ρ = 1 can be Nash-implemented
by an augmented trading post mechanism. This strengthened previous results which only handled
Nash welfare [8] or assumed agents did not behave strategically [20]. Next, we showed that DSE
implementation for this problem is generally impossible, with the exception of maxmin welfare,
where a simple revelation mechanism does indeed DSE-implement maxmin welfare. Although this
revelation mechanism does not Nash-implement maxmin welfare, we were able to Nash-implement
maxmin welfare with a different mechanism.
We were not able to resolve whether utilitarian welfare is Nash-implementable for bandwidth
allocation. Our trading post mechanism breaks down in this setting, since fj(b) = b
1−1 = 1 is
not a valid constraint curve. Maskin’s monotonicity approach is not viable either, since utilitarian
welfare does not satisfy no veto power. We leave this as an open question.
Another interesting direction would be to extend these results to a wider range of utility func-
tions. Our reduction between price curves and trading post means that if price curve equilibria
maximizing CES welfare were shown to exist for a wider range of utility functions, it seems likely
that our Nash implementation results would carry over as well (depending on the form of the price
curves).
It would also be interesting to consider another dimension of strategic behavior by allowing
agents to choose which path in the network to use. In this case, we could write each agent’s utility
function as ui(xi) = maxp∈Pi minj∈p xij, where Pi is the set of paths from agent i’s desired source to
desired destination. This is reminiscent of routing games, in that agents are strategically choosing
their paths, but still distinct, in that each agent may use the same link in different quantities (i.e.,
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receive different amounts of bandwidth). Although this model is less accurate in terms of how the
internet actually works (see Section 1), it may be an appropriate model for other situations.
More broadly, we feel that trading post is a powerful mechanism that is able to simulate a
price-taking market while also handling strategic behavior. We wonder if trading post, or variants
thereof, may be useful in designing mechanisms for other resource allocation problems as well.
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